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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reverses dis-
trict court holding that application of diligent search rule instead
of New York's demand and refusal rule for return of stolen artwork
was sufficient grounds to relieve party from prior judgment
New York City, with international auction houses such as
Sotheby's and Christie's, has evolved as a central location for the
world of art.' The particularly high prices paid to acquire works
of art have created another profitable activity, namely art theft.2
1 See Porter v. Wertz, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 701, 421 N.E.2d 500, 502, 439 N.Y.S.2d 105,
107 (1981) (citing amicus brief by Art Dealers Association of America, Inc., noting
that art business is centered in New York); Leah E. Eisen, The Missing Piece: A Dis-
cussion of Theft, Statutes of Limitations, and Title Disputes in the Art World, 81 J.
CRmi. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1067-68 (1991) (discussing skyrocketing prices of art
works sold through New York's auction houses); Sydney M. Drum, Comment,
DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making New York a Haven for Stolen Art?, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv.
909 (1989). -New York City, the mecca of [art and antique sales], boasts over 500
private art dealers and auction houses. Buying and selling art and collectibles is chic,
liquid, and profitable." Id. at 909 (footnotes omitted).
2 See Andrea E. Hayworth, Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty Pic-
ture, 43 DuKE L.J. 337 (1993) (noting that "art is no longer mere exhibition 'fare' but
an investment worth millions of dollars . . . ."); Charles D. Webb, Jr., Whose Art Is It
Anyway? Title Disputes and Resolutions in Art Theft Cases, 79 Ky. L.J. 883 (1990-91).
"Given the uniqueness of individual works of art, their high value, their rapid appre-
ciation, and numerous occasions of theft, courts often are called upon to resolve dis-
putes between two parties claiming ownership of a particular piece of art." Id. at 883;
Stephen L. Foutty, Comment, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v.
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.: Entrenchment of the Due Diligence Requirement
in Replevin Actions for Stolen Art, 43 Vm-. L. REv. 1839, 1840 (1990) ('The inflated
prices have inspired people without a prior interest in art to conceive a sudden pas-
sion for collecting by any available means."); J. Robert Horton, Beyond Cyprus v.
Goldberg: Recommendations for Dealers, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 1990, at 5 (discussing syn-
dicated art sales); Eisen, supra note 1, at 1067-68 ("[Elxorbitant sale prices are by no
means extraordinary.").
The market for collectible art has not always been so profitable; much of the
growth has come within the last thirty years. Susan Lee, Greed Is Not Just for Profit,
FoRBEs, Apr. 18, 1988, at 65. Interests have been fueled in collectible art because the
market "has become a more liquid market in which transaction costs are lower, infor-
mation is better, instruments are more diversified and the financing of purchases and
sales has become more refined." Id. at 66. Auction houses adapted their business
methods to accommodate these developments. For example, auction houses print de-
tailed catalogs when conducting sales and employ staffs of experts who conduct re-
search in appraising pieces of art. Id. at 68-69. This trend boomed during the 1980s.
See The Art Market: Back to Reality, NEwswEEI, Jan. 13, 1992, at 66 (discussing econ-
omy's effect on art sales). "[Aluction sales drove the prices of the impressionist, mod-
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Frequently, valuable pieces of stolen artwork end up in the hands
of a good-faith purchaser who has no knowledge of the original
theft.' In New York, the statute of limitations for the recovery of
stolen property is three years.' As against a good-faith purchaser,
however, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
owner demands the return of the property, and the good-faith pur-
ern and contemporary works to giddy heights. By spring 1990, the price of an average
picture had risen roughly 150 percent .... " Id.; see also Sophie Burnham, As the
Stakes in the Art World Rise, So Do Laws and Lawsuits, N.Y. Thnms, Feb. 15, 1987,
§ 2, at 1 (noting that 80% of all money spent on art occurred between 1977 and 1987).
Art theft has also become quite a lucrative business; 1988 estimates character-
ized art theft and fraud as a "billion-dollar-a-year" business. Pam Lambert, Magazine
of Art and Larceny, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1988, at 16. Recovering stolen artwork is not
easily accomplished. Drum, supra note 1, at 912. Further thwarting the original
owner's efforts to locate the painting is the lack of investigation by the art dealer into
the source, id., or the title of the art work. Porter, 53 N.Y.2d at 701, 421 N.E.2d at 502,
439 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (citing amicus brief from Art Dealers Association of America, Inc.
stating that duty of inquiry would "cripple" New York art business). Investigation by
the art dealer is not the accepted practice in the art business. Id. Trafficking stolen
art work is thought to be one of the most profitable criminal activities, second only to
the international drug trade. See Eisen, supra note 1, at 1068 (citing Milton Esterow,
Confessions of an Art Cop, ARTNEWs, May 1988, at 134).
3 See Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991) (suit for declara-
tory judgment by possessor of murals stolen during high school renovation in 1970);
Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian Land Co. of Am., N.V., 931 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1991)
(suit to recover "Yamashita Treasure" wrongfully converted by government of Philip-
pines in 1971); Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feld-
man Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (suit by Republic of Cyprus to re-
cover mosaics stolen from Greek-Orthodox church in late 1970s); Kunstsammlungen
zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) (suit by German Government to
recover paintings looted by American troops in 1945); Republic of Turk. v. Metropoli-
tan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (suit by Turkish Government to
recover artifacts stolen from excavation site); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v.
Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 569 N.E.2d 426, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1991) (suit by museum to
recover painting stolen by mailroom clerk in 1960s); Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647,
253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1st Dep't 1964) (suit to recover painting stolen by Nazis in 1941);
Lieber v. Mohawk Arms, Inc., 64 Misc. 2d 206, 314 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Oneida
County 1970) (suit to recover collection of Hitler's belongings stolen by plaintiff's
chauffeur).
In this country, the law generally holds that a thief receives void title upon steal-
ing property and thus, can never convey good title. See J. Robert Horton, How to Im-
prove Standing as Good-Faith Art Buyer, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 13, 1990, at 5. Subsequent
buyers of the stolen property may not obtain or convey title, whether they purchase in
good faith or not. Id. "This means that the original owner can recover stolen art from
a perfectly innocent person in possession, many buyers removed, many years later,
who paid full market value.. . ." Id.
4 See CPLR 214(3) (McKinney 1990). "The following actions must be commenced
within three years: .. . an action to recover a chattel or damages for the taking or
detaining of a chattel .... " Id.
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chaser refuses to return it. 5 Recently, in DeWeerth v. Baldinger,6
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to apply this
rule, preserving instead a seven-year-old holding that required
the true owner to make a diligent search for the stolen painting to
prevent the statute of limitations from beginning to run.'
The painting in question in DeWeerth is Claude Monet's
"Champs de B1 6 V6thevil."8 In 1943, the plaintiff, Gerda Doro-
5 See Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28, 30 (1874) ("It is well settled that a bona fide
purchaser of personal property ... from a wrong-doer is not liable for a conversion
without a demand and refusal."); Goodwin v. Wertheimer, 99 N.Y. 149, 153, 1 N.E.
404, 405 (1885) ("The original possession of [the defendant] being lawful, and not tor-
tious, it was necessary to change the character of his possession by a demand and
refusal before the plaintiffs could maintain an action against him for conversion, or to
recover the goods."); see also Menzel, 22 A.D.2d at 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (holding
statute of limitations begins to run at time of demand and refusal); Cohen v. Keiser,
Inc., 246 A.D. 277, 285 N.Y.S. 488 (1st Dep't 1936) (holding that demand and refusal
required to make possession tortious); Lieber, 64 Misc. 2d at 208, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 512
(holding that defendant acting in good faith has no title to property stolen from
owner); DAviD D. SIEGEL, NEW YoRK PRA TiCE § 40, at 49 (2d ed. 1991). "In certain
instances a demand may be necessary before a claim accrues, as where... one from
whom property has been taken seeks to recover it from an innocent third person who
may now have possession of it." Id. (citing Menzel).
The CPLR also provides that "where a demand is necessary to entitle a person to
commence an action, the time within which the action must be commenced shall be
computed from the time when the right to make the demand is complete .... " CPLR
206(a) (McKinney 1990). CPLR 206(a) would apply in a case of mistaken delivery,
where the possessor of the property is known, and, therefore, the true owner is imme-
diately aware of the identity of the defendant. Federal Ins. Co. v. Fries, 78 Misc. 2d
805, 355 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1974). Consequently, the statute of
limitations begins to run immediately because the plaintiff is instantly entitled and
able to demand the return of the property. Id. at 810, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 747. This pre-
vents the plaintiff from "extend[ing] the statute indefinitely, merely by postponing the
making of a demand." Id. Courts have rejected this analysis, however, in situations
involving theft where the identity of the bona fide purchaser is not revealed. See Men-
zel, 22 A.D.2d at 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 44. 'he precedents in this State suggest that
with respect to a bona fide purchaser of personal property a demand by the rightful
owner is a substantive, rather than a procedural, prerequisite to the bringing of an
action for conversion by the owner." Id. (citations omitted); see also Elicofon, 678 F.2d
at 1161-63 (following Menzel); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir.
1987) (Newman, J.) (citing Menzel), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988), relief from
judgment granted, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994). A clear rationale for this distinction is that the true
owner will not immediately know the identity of the bona fide purchaser of his or her
stolen property, and therefore, unlike the mistaken delivery scenario, will not be in
position to make an immediate demand. See Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1162 & n.22.
6 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
7 Id. at 1276; see DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112 (holding that plaintiff's failure to
conduct reasonably diligent search caused statute of limitations to run before demand
was made).
8 DeWeerth, 38 F.3d at 1268.
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thea DeWeerth, gave the painting to her sister, Gisela von Palm,
to hold for safekeeping until the end of World War II.9 The paint-
ing, however, was missing from von Palm's castle at the conclu-
sion of the war in 1945.10 From 1946 to 1957, DeWeerth made
several unsuccessful attempts to locate her painting." In 1956,
unbeknownst to DeWeerth, the painting resurfaced at Wilden-
stein & Co., Inc., a New York City art gallery. 2 The following
year, as DeWeerth abandoned her search for the painting, Edith
Marks Baldinger purchased the Monet and displayed it in her
apartment in New York City.' 3
In 1982, DeWeerth finally discovered that Baldinger was in
possession of the painting.14 DeWeerth made a written demand
9 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105. DeWeerth inherited the Monet from her father in
1922, who had originally purchased the painting in 1908. Id. at 104.
10 Id. at 105. Toward the end of the War in 1945, DeWeerth's sister had American
soldiers quartered in her castle. Id. Although no direct proof was ever offered as to
what happened to the Monet, the painting's disappearance coincided with the depar-
ture of the American soldiers. Id.
11 Id. DeWeerth began her search for the Monet with the filing of a standard
report which described the items considered lost during the war. Id. Mrs. DeWeerth
submitted the report to the military government serving the Bonn-Cologne area. Id.
In 1948, she contacted her attorney and inquired into filing an insurance claim for the
painting and other lost items. Id. Her attorney notified her that the Monet was not
covered by insurance. Id. In 1955, DeWeerth enlisted the assistance of Dr. Alfred
Stange, "a former professor of art and an expert in medieval paintings, and asked him
to investigate the painting's whereabouts. Stange responded that the photo [she sent
him] was insufficient evidence with which to begin a search, and DeWeerth did not
pursue the matter with him further." Id. at 105. DeWeerth, at the age of 63, made one
last effort to locate the painting in 1957, when she sent a list of her missing items to
the Bandeskriminalamt, the West German equivalent of the United States Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Id. This effort also proved fruitless. Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. Wildenstein acquired the painting from an art dealer in Switzerland, re-
tained possession of it from December 1956 through June 1957, and offered it to sev-
eral prospective buyers. Id. Baldinger purchased it for approximately $30,000. Id.
Thereafter, Baldinger displayed the painting in her Park Avenue apartment.
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688, 691 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1987) (Newman, J.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988), relief from judgment granted,
804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct.
512 (1994). It was displayed twice publicly, however, in New York from October 29 to
November 1, 1957, and April 2 to May 9, 1970. Id.
14 DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 691. DeWeerth's nephew learned of one of the public
displays of the painting through a catalogue of Monet's work. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at
105; see supra note 13 (discussing public displays of painting). In 1982, DeWeerth,
through her attorney, requested that Wildenstein identify the party in possession of
the Monet, but Wildenstein refused. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105-06. DeWeerth
brought suit in the Supreme Court, New York County "seeking 'disclosure to aid in
bringing an action'" pursuant to CPLR 3202(c). DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 691-92.
The court found for DeWeerth and "order[ed] Wildenstein to reveal the identity of the
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for its return, which Baldinger refused.15 Two weeks later,
DeWeerth filed suit in federal court for its return.16 The district
court ruled in favor of DeWeerth, finding that (1) the defendant's
claim that the plaintiff failed to conduct a reasonably diligent
search was inappropriate;1 7 (2) the statute of limitations did not
run before a demand was made; and (3) the defense of laches was
not available to the defendant.'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,' 9 con-
cluding in its Erie20 analysis that to prevent the statute of limita-
tions from beginning to run, New York state courts would require
the plaintiff to conduct a reasonably diligent search for the paint-
ing.21 The court also determined that DeWeerth did not conduct a
possessor. [DeWeerth] thereafter learned that defendant Baldinger possessed the Mo-
net." Id. at 692.
15 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 106. On December 27, 1982, DeWeerth, by letter, de-
manded the return of the Monet from Baldinger. By a letter dated February 1, 1983,
Baldinger refused to return the painting. Id.
16 The action was based on diversity of citizenship, applying New York substan-
tive law. Id.
17 DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 695.
18 Id. at 694-95; see infra note 25 (discussing laches defense).
19 DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
20 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 110-11. In so holding, the court noted that a reasonably
diligent search had never been required in a suit against an innocent purchaser in
New York, and stated:
We have elected not to submit the unresolved state law issue in this appeal
to the New York Court of Appeals pursuant to the recently authorized proce-
dure permitting that Court to answer questions certified to it by the United
States Supreme Court, a United States Court of Appeals, or a court of last
resort of any state. That valuable procedure should be confined to issues
likely to recur with some frequency. Though the issue presented by this ap-
peal is interesting, we do not think it will recur with sufficient frequency to
warrant use of the certification procedure.
Id. at 108 n.5 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). It is submitted that the court was
faced with enough precedent for this issue to be deemed to occur with "sufficient fre-
quency." See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1st Dep't 1964)
(holding statute of limitations commenced at demand and refusal of painting's re-
turn); Lieber v. Mohawk Arms, 64 Misc. 2d 206, 314 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. Oneida
County 1970) (holding that defendant acting in good faith obtains no title from thief);
O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 863 (N.J. 1980) (holding New York's demand and refusal
rule not applicable); Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir.
1982) (holding that New York rule is demand and refusal). A number of cases have
arisen since the DeWeerth decision in 1987 which have addressed this issue, explicitly
holding that no diligent search is necessary to prevent the statute of limitations from
running. See supra note 3; see also A Stradivarius Lost 27 Years Now Brings Tug-of-
War, N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 23, 1994, at 35 (discussing UCLA dispute to recover violin miss-
ing since 1967).
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diligent search, and, therefore, that the statute of limitations had
run before she made her demand.2 2
Approximately three years later, the New York Court of Ap-
peals addressed this statute of limitations issue in Solomon R.
Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell.23 The Guggenheim court held
that New York's demand and refusal rule does not require a plain-
tiff to conduct a reasonably diligent search in order to prevent the
statute of limitations from running.24 Rather, the statute of limi-
tations will begin to run against an owner only when the owner's
demand for return is refused by the good-faith purchaser.25
Thereafter, DeWeerth returned to federal court to seek relief
from the prior judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b).26 The district court concluded that it was appropriate
to grant the motion because the decision to grant a Rule 60(b) mo-
tion is within the judge's discretion, 27 and the plaintiff had dis-
22 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111-12.
23 77 N.Y.2d 311, 569 N.E.2d 426, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1991).
24 Id. at 317-18, 569 N.E.2d at 429-30, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 626-27. In Guggenheim, a
Chagall painting disappeared from the museum during the 1960s. Id. at 315, 569
N.E.2d at 428, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The museum, however, never notified any law
enforcement agencies, museums, or galleries regarding the theft for fear of "driving
the [painting] further underground and greatly diminishing the possibility that it
would ever be recovered." Id. at 315-16, 569 N.E.2d at 428, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
25 Id. at 318, 569 N.E.2d at 429-30, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 626-27. In holding that the
plaintiff's lack of due diligence was not relevant in determining when the statute of
limitations begins to run, the court stated
In DeWeerth v. Baldinger,... the Second Circuit took note of the fact that
New York case law treats thieves and good-faith purchasers differently and
looked to that difference as a basis for imposing a reasonable diligence re-
quirement on the owners of stolen art.... We have reexamined the relevant
New York case law and we conclude that the Second Circuit should not have
imposed a duty of reasonable diligence on the owners of stolen art work for
purposes of the Statute of Limitations.
Id. Guggenheim was remanded, however, because the court held that failure to con-
duct a reasonably diligent search is relevant "in the context of [the innocent pur-
chaser's] laches defense. The conduct of both [the innocent purchaser] and the mu-
seum will be relevant to any consideration of this defense at the trial level, and...
prejudice will also need to be shown." Id. at 321, 569 N.E.2d at 431, 567 N.Y.S.2d at
628 (citation omitted). Ultimately, the laches issue was never resolved because the
parties settled the suit. Richard P6rez-Pefia, Suit over Chagall Watercolor Is Settled
Day After Trial Starts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at B3.
26 DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 38 F.3d 1266
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994); FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) (relieving party from
final judgment under certain circumstances).
27 DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 548; see Mendell ex rel. Viacom, Inc. v. Gollust, 909
F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that Rule 60(b) motions are discretionary and are
granted "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances"), aff'd, 501 U.S. 115 (1991);
see also infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)).
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played the "extraordinary circumstances" necessary to support the
motion.28 Thus, the court held for DeWeerth.29 In an opinion
written by Judge Walker, however, the Second Circuit reversed
again, holding that the district court abused its discretion under
Rule 60(b) in ruling that the interest of finality of litigation was
outweighed by the unfairness resulting to DeWeerth.30
In a vehement dissent, Judge Owen criticized the use of the
unreasonable delay rule.31 After enumerating all of the New York
authority for the demand and refusal rule3 2 and discussing New
York's long-standing policy of protecting the rights of the property
owner,33 Judge Owen agreed with the district court's holding that
DeWeerth should not be penalized for suing in federal court
rather than state court. 4
28 DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 548-50. The court held that DeWeerth was entitled
to relief "fiun order to prevent the working of an extreme and undue hardship .... " Id.
at 550 (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 551-52.
30 DeWeerth, 38 F.3d at 1275. The Second Circuit characterized the Guggenheim
decision as a change in the law of New York. Id. at 1272. As such, the court held that
the fact that Erie requires a federal court to "follow state law when deciding a diver-
sity case does not mean that a subsequent change in the law of the state will provide
grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)." Id. at 1272-73 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Second Circuit concluded that the district court "inappropriately disturbed a final
judgment in a case that had been fully litigated .... By filing her state law claim in a
federal forum, [DeWeerth] knew that any open question of state law would be decided
by a federal as opposed to a New York state court." Id. (emphasis added). While it is
true that a federal court sitting in diversity, facing an unsettled issue of state law,
must make only a reasonable prediction on how the courts of the state would decide
an issue, it is submitted that there was no "unsettled" state law issue in DeWeerth-
New York's rule to commence the running of the statute of limitations is, and always
has been, demand and refusal. See supra note 5 (discussing New York authorities on
demand and refusal).
31 DeWeerth, 38 F.3d at 1277 (Owen, J., dissenting).
32 Id. (Owen, J., dissenting); see supra notes 3 & 5 (discussing authority for de-
mand and refusal rule).
33 DeWeerth, 38 F.3d at 1277-78 & n.4 (Owen, J., dissenting). "New York case law
has long protected the right of the owner whose property has been stolen to recover
that property, even if it is in the possession of a good-faith purchaser for value." Id. at
1277 (Owen, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
34 Id. at 1278-79 (Owen, J., dissenting). Judge Owen agreed with the district
court's reasoning that failure to grant the Rule 60 motion would deny DeWeerth the
right to recover her property solely because she initially brought her action in federal
rather than state court, and argued that such inconsistency is exactly the type of
result that the Erie holding was meant to avoid. Id. at 1278 "'[The nub of the policy
that underlies Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident
of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State Court a block
away should not lead to a substantially different result.'" Id. (Owen, J., dissenting)
(quoting Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (Frankfurter,
J.)). Judge Owen responded to the majority opinion by stating, "I cannot accept the
1994]
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Rule 60(b)(6) provides that a "court may relieve a party...
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for... any... reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 5 This dis-
cretionary rule permits a judge to relieve a party from a judgment
when it is "'appropriate to accomplish justice' "36 or where there
are "extraordinary circumstances or where the judgment may
work an extreme and undue hardship .... "37
The Second Circuit's characterization of the district court's
decision to grant the motion as an abuse of discretion38 seems mis-
placed. In emphasizing the policy of finality, the majority appar-
ently overlooked the existence of "extraordinary circumstances"39
which permit a court to grant relief from a prior judgment. New
York's demand and refusal rule is well established, and had been
so in 1987 when DeWeerth first reached the Second Circuit.40 In-
deed, the Second Circuit conceded this in 1987 when the court rec-
ognized "that no New York court has ever held that the unreason-
able delay rule applies before the plaintiff has learned the identity
of the person to whom demand must be made."41 Instead of certi-
result here that Mrs. DeWeerth, who sought our federal diversity jurisdiction, must
now suffer the consequences... of the said soon-corrected prediction.... Should not
the impact of Guggenheim rather be shouldered by us, notwithstanding the integrity
of our error?" Id. at 1279 (Owen, J., dissenting). Judge Owen suggested that the fear
of having to deal with future Rule 60(b) invocations in potentially unworthy cases
should not preclude the court from putting aside the doctrine of finality in this case
where the requisite extraordinary circumstances exist. Id.
35 FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(6).
36 International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977)
(quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949)), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1014 (1978).
37 Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987). "The only criteria necessary is to 'accomplish justice.'
Specifically,... 'the court has broad legal discretion to grant or deny relief in light of
all the relevant circumstances'...." In re Duralec, 21 B.R. 618, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982) (quoting In re Ireco Indus., Inc., 2 B.R. 76, 84 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979)). "Unques-
tionably, therefore, it is well within the jurisdictional ambit of [a court] to vacate an
order or decree which is res judicata." Id.
38 DeWeerth, 38 F.3d at 1269.
39 DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Mata.
rese, 801 F.2d at 106), rev'd, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
40 See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 317-18, 569
N.E.2d 426, 429-30, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626-27 (1991). "[T]he abundant case law
spell[s] out the demand and refusal rule, convinc[ing] us that that rule remains the
law in New York and that there is no reason to obscure its straightforward protection
of true owners by creating a duty of reasonable diligence." Id. at 319, 569 N.E.2d at
430, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 627; see supra note 5 (discussing New York case law on demand
and refusal rule).
41 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 107.
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fying the issue to the New York Court of Appeals,42 the Second
Circuit decided to reformulate the applicable law,43 and in effect,
made DeWeerth the only plaintiff under New York law ever to be
denied the return of her painting from a good-faith purchaser on
the grounds that the statute of limitations had run.44
When the Second Circuit originally decided DeWeerth, the
court relied on only one case that supported the requirement of
due diligence.45 In O'Keeffe v. Snyder,4 6 the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that New Jersey law imposes the discovery rule, and
therefore, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plain-
tiff knows or "reasonably should have known through the exercise
of due diligence . .. the identity of the possessor . . . ."41 It is
submitted, however, that the Second Circuit should not have re-
lied to such an extent on O'Keeffe. The New Jersey Supreme
Court first determined whether New York or New Jersey law gov-
erned the action.48 In holding that New Jersey law governed, the
court distinguished New York's demand and refusal rule, ac-
42 Id. at 105 n.5; see supra note 21 (quoting text of court's footnote 5).
43 Cf Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1163 (2d Cir.
1982) (refusing to add due diligence requirement to New York law). See infra notes
51-54 (discussing Elicofon).
44 See Mary B.W. Tabor, Rare Ruling Leave a Monet Hanging, N.Y. TImEs, June
10, 1994, at B7. "Legal experts say... [it] is the first time in memory that the courts
have denied someone the right to recover stolen work." Id.; see also DeWeerth, 38 F.3d
at 1277-78 (Owen, J., dissenting). "[N]o prior New York statute of limitations ruling
had any suggestion of a pre-demand due diligence requirement, or that the issue was
ever raised, or even could have been considered." Id. at 1277 (Owen, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has been called to interpret New York law in two
stolen artwork cases after the Guggenheim decision. See Hoelzer v. City of Stamford.,
933 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1991) (stolen murals); Golden Budha Corp. v. Canadian Land
Co. of Am., N.V., 931 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1991) (stolen treasure). In both cases, the
court explicitly held that New York's demand and refusal rule does not impose a duty
of due diligence on the plaintiff to prevent the statute of limitations from running.
Hoelzer, 933 F.2d at 1136-37; Golden Budha, 931 F.2d at 201. It would appear, there-
fore, that DeWeerth is the only plaintiff in New York to have the statute of limitations
run before ever even making a demand for the return of her property.
45 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109.
46 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
47 Id. at 870. In O'Keeffe, artist Georgia O'Keeffe sued to recover some of her own
works which had been stolen from her New York art gallery in 1946. Id. at 865. With
the exception of discussing the burglary with colleagues from the art world, she made
absolutely no attempt to locate her paintings until 1972, when she contacted the Art
Dealers Association of America, which maintains a registry of stolen paintings. Id. at
865-66. O'Keeffe discovered the whereabouts of her paintings in 1975, and demanded
their return in February, 1976. Id. at 866. After the possessor refused, she brought
an action for replevin. Id.
48 Id. at 868.
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knowledging that "[ilf the New York statute applied, [O'Keeffe's]
action would have been commenced within the period of
limitations."49
In relying on O'Keeffe, the Second Circuit ignored substan-
tial contrary authority.50 In Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v.
Elicofon,5 1 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York stated that, while a due diligence requirement
may or may not be justified, it was unnecessary to decide the is-
sue, since the evidence clearly demonstrated that any required
duty of due diligence was satisfied.5 2 In affirming, the Second Cir-
cuit stated that "even if New York law might occasionally favor
the thief or bad faith purchaser, we are charged only with apply-
ing New York law, not with remaking or improving it." 53 The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, disregarded these observations from
Elicofon when deciding DeWeerth.54
The Second Circuit further ignored a bill which would have
changed New York's demand and refusal rule.5 In 1986, the New
York Legislature passed a bill which "instituted a discovery rule
in actions for recovery of art objects brought against certain not-
49 Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, the O'Keeffe decision was not unanimous-
two strong dissents were filed. Id. at 877-85 (Sullivan & Handler, JJ., dissenting).
Both dissenting opinions criticized the application of a "due diligence" requirement.
Id. In his dissent, Justice Handler argued that because the duty of diligence is placed
on the owner and not the possessor or trafficker of the stolen property, art theft is not
discouraged. Id. at 878 (Handler, J., dissenting).
50 See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1276-79 (2d Cir.) (Owen, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994); supra note 5 (reviewing New York authorities
on demand and refusal rule); see also infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Governor Cuomo's veto of bill to change demand and refusal rule).
51 536 F. Supp. 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying New York law), aff'd, 678 F.2d
1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
52 Id. at 849-50. "Efforts to locate the paintings... followed many channels...
[and] reflect a continuous and diligent search." Id. at 852.
53 Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1163 (emphasis added). The court further argued that
"[als between the policy... of allowing the statute of limitations to run against an
owner regardless of his ignorance, and tolling it indefinitely against a good faith pur-
chaser until a demand is made, we are satisfied that New York has closen the latter
course." Id. at 1163-64 (emphasis added).
54 DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 110-11. Ironically, the court cited Elicofon to support the
proposition that a reasonably diligent search is required. Id. at 110; cf Elicofon, 678
F.2d at 1161 ("[The statute of limitations begins to run only upon the purchaser's
refusal to return the property."). Elicofon is not the only case the Second Circuit ig-
nored in reaching its decision. See supra note 5 (discussing New York authorities on
demand and refusal).
55 See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 319, 569 N.E.2d
426, 430, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623, 627 (1991). "New York has already considered-and re-
jected-adoption of a discovery rule." Id.
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for-profit institutions."5 6 If such an institution came into posses-
sion of a work of art and gave the public notice of its possession,
the statute of limitations would then begin to run.57 Governor
Mario Cuomo vetoed the bill, fearful that New York would become
a "'haven for cultural property stolen abroad since such objects
[would] be immune from recovery under the limited time periods
established by the bill.' "5 8  This unambiguous declaration of New
York's decision to reject a discovery rule arose eighteen months
before the Second Circuit's original decision. 9 Moreover, the Sec-
ond Circuit ignored a long line of case law in New York which
clearly stated the rule to be demand and refusal and has never
held that a plaintiff must conduct a diligent search to prevent the
statute of limitations from running when a good-faith purchaser of
unknown identity possesses the painting.60
Finally, in Matarese v. LeFevre,6 1 the Second Circuit held that
"[a] post judgment change in the law having retroactive applica-
tion may, in special circumstances, constitute an extraordinary
circumstance warranting vacation of... judgment."6 2 Since Gug-
genheim was not a change in law, but merely a clarification of pre-
56 Id. Both houses passed the bill. See N.Y.S. 3274-B, N.YA. 11462-A, 209th Sess.
(1986).
57 Guggenheim, 77 N.Y.2d at 319, 569 N.E.2d at 430, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
58 Id. (quoting Governor's veto message). Following the advice of the United
States Department of State, the United States Department of Justice, and the United
States Information Agency, the Governor vetoed the bill. Id.; see Irvin Molotsky, 3
U.S. Agencies Urge Veto of Art-Claim Bill, N.Y. TmES, July 23, 1986, at C15. The
advice of the three agencies was unusual "because of the number of agencies involved
and because of the forcefulness of their language." Id. "The bill does not balance fairly
the legitimate interests of foreign countries [as art owners] in recovering their lost or
stolen art work with the legitimate interests of museums or other good faith purchas-
ers of art." Cuomo Vetoes Art-Ownership Bill, N.Y. Tis, July 29, 1986, at 014 (quot-
ing Governor Cuomo).
59 See Cuomo Vetoes Art-Ownership Bill, supra note 58, at 014 (discussing bill's
defeat in 1986).
60 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing New York case law regard-
ing demand and refusal rule); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1276-78 (2d Cir.)
(Owen, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
61 801 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987).
62 Id. at 106; see Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 765 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding change in state law sufficient "extraordinary circumstances"). "Had [the Ohio
Supreme Court] reached the decision in [the original case] that it ultimately reached
... plaintiffs would have prevailed... during the first appeal to this court." Id. at 580
(emphasis added). "To comply with the principle of comity which undergirds our fed-
eral system, we are obliged to give full effect to decisions of New York's highest court
on issues involving the application of New York law." Sanchez v. United States, 696
F.2d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
"Milt would seem that if the Erie factor does not make [DeWeerth] extraordinary it is
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existing law,63 it would seem that the district court was within its
discretion in granting the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b).
It is submitted that the Second Circuit should not have re-
versed the district court's ruling granting DeWeerth's Rule 60(b)
motion. The district judge determined that the clear misrepresen-
tation of New York law by the Second Circuit compelled relief
from the judgment and exercised his discretion pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6).14 It is further suggested that the painting's value-cur-
rently worth over one million dollars-and DeWeerth's extremely
advanced age met the requisite "extraordinary" circumstances
necessary to relieve DeWeerth from the erroneous judgment.6 5 It
appears that the Second Circuit should have affirmed the district
court in granting DeWeerth's Rule 60(b) motion, and that the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision should be reversed en banc.
Austin S. Faberman
difficult to determine what would be extraordinary." Robert A. Barker, Principles of
Finality; AIDS Phobia, N.Y. L.J., July 18, 1994, at 3, 8.
63 See supra note 5 (discussing New York authorities on demand and refusal);
supra note 30 (discussing Second Circuit's mischaracterization of Guggenheim as
"change" in law).
64 See DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 550.
65 See Tabor, supra note 44, at B7 (noting current value of Monet). DeWeerth
was approximately 100 years old at the time of this latest decision. See Widow, 93,
Loses Claim to Monet Landscape Valued at $500,000, L-A TzMs, Jan. 2, 1988, Part 6,
at 2.
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